US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
8-1-2012

2012-13 Key Strategic Issues List
Antulio J. Echevarria II
SSI

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Antulio J. Echevarria II, 2012-13 Key Strategic Issues List ( US Army War College Press, 2012),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/551

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

KS
IL

Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.

Strategic Studies Institute
USAWC KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST 2012-2013

AY 2013
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST (KSIL)

*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of
charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of
charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications
may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit
given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

NOTE: Topics with (**) are priority from Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; topics with (*)
are priority topics from Headquarters Department of the Army, G-3/5 and G-4.

ii

CONTENTS
Foreword ………………………...................................…………........……v
Part I: Priority HQDA and Consensus Topics ……...........................…1
Functional Strategic Issues ........................................................................1
I. Landpower Employment: Evolving
		
Roles and Missions …...…..………................................................ 1
II. Landpower Generation and Sustainment ....................................2
III. Strategy & Military Change in an Austere Environment.......... 7
IV. Leadership, Civil-Military Relations, and Culture..................... 9
V. Cyber Attack/Defense, Networks, Information
		 Technology......................................................................................11
VI. Homeland Security/Civil Support..............................................12
Evolving Regional Strategic Issues ........................................................13
I. The Middle East and North Africa ............................................. 13
II. Sub-Saharan Africa ....................................................................... 13
III. Asia-Pacific .....................................................................................14
IV. Europe ............................................................................................ 15
V. South and Central Asia ................................................................ 16
VI. Western Hemisphere ....................................................................16
Part II: Command Sponsored Topics .....................................................17
National Guard Bureau ........................................................................17
U.S. Army Reserve, Office of the Chief ..............................................21
U.S. Africa Command .......................................................................... 24
U.S. Cyber Command ...........................................................................25
U.S. Army Cyber Command ............................................................... 27
U.S. European Command .................................................................... 29

iii

CONTENTS (Cont.)
U.S. Northern Command .....................................................................31
U.S. Southern Command ..................................................................... 33
U.S. Transportation Command ...........................................................35
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command................................... 39
Strategic Studies Institute Subject Matter/Regional Experts.............41

iv

FOREWORD
The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is published annually for the
purpose of making students and other researchers aware of strategic
topics that are, or are likely to become, of special importance to the U.S.
Army. The list is a compilation of input from the faculty at the Strategic
Studies Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army’s senior
leadership, as well as from civilian and military defense experts. The
topics are updated annually and reflect current as well as ongoing
strategic concerns. The underlying theme this year is strategic
“rebalancing”—as the U.S. Army prepares to shift its focus from
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to carrying out
rebalancing initiatives, shaping the strategic environment, deterring
regional aggression, improving crisis response capabilities, and
completing its downsizing efforts. Consolidation of important strategic
and tactical successes in the war against al Qaeda will also continue,
as will the efforts to distill lessons from the campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the faculty members
of the Strategic Studies Institute listed herein for further information
regarding current or potential topics.

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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PART I
PRIORITY HQDA AND CONSENSUS TOPICS
FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
POC: COL Louis H. Jordan, Jr. (717) 245-4125
louis.h.jordan.mil@mail.mil
I. Landpower Employment: Evolving Roles and Missions
1. ** Defining the Future Threat.
2. **Shifting the Army’s Focus to the Pacific.
3. **Conventional Forces: Building Partnership Capacity.
a. *Assess the ability of current partners to assume Phase
IV/V operational responsibility in a conflict. Consider
both warfighting and sustainment capabilities.
4. *The demonstrated inability of the interagency to source its
support to land operations fully (most notably during Phase
IV/V) places a burden on the Army to provide stability and
reconstruction capabilities. Should the Army institutionalize
those required capabilities by designing a force structure
that specifically addresses stability and reconstruction
requirements, and if so how?
5. *The Army has revised FM 3-0 and changed the Army
Operating Concept to Unified Operations—enabled by core
competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area
Security. How will this change the Army’s contribution to
joint force operations?
6. *Assess the implications for the War Powers Act with regard
to U.S. participation in contingency operations in Libya.
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7. Recommend ways that the Army can broaden its focus
from counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and training of
partners to shaping the strategic environment, preventing the
outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the
Army’s readiness to respond in force to a range of complex
contingencies worldwide.
II. Landpower Generation and Sustainment
1. *Evaluate the Army’s ability to generate and sustain
landpower in a protracted conflict.
a. *Given the decreasing support and capacity from allied
forces, does the United States need to increase the size of
the ground components to ensure sufficient overmatch/
manageable risk in future ground-centric joint campaigns?
b. *How should the Army (Operational and Generating
Force) organize to ensure it is expansible should it need
to grow to meet demand in time of conflict? Consider the
need for mid- and senior-grade officers and NCOs.
c. *What is the Army’s responsibility to provide a strategic
reserve?
d. *Should the Army continue utilization of ARFORGEN
as a core process versus its use of a temporary wartime
procedure? How does the Army’s Title 10 requirement to
generate forces change based on conditions and demand?
e. *Conduct a review of the progress of the Materiel Core
Enterprise in integrating sustainment, materiel systems
development, and improved materiel life-cycle functions.
Assess the level of industry engagement in materiel
enterprise strategy and forums and potential contributions.
f. *Conduct a review to find the best ways to equip our
Soldiers in the current operating environment.
g. *Sustainment of BCT units in current and future
operational environments will take place over widely
dispersed areas of challenging terrain. Reduced logistics
structure and personnel tax units to deliver critical but
2

h.

i.
j.
k.
l.

m.
n.

often small items and supplies over terrain and distance,
using convoys or non-organic requested airframes.
Assess whether small UAVs have the potential to address
operational shortcomings and challenges associated with
aerial delivery under these scenarios.
*The dismounted squad has emerged as a “strategic force,”
with the future squad envisioned as being organized,
trained, equipped, and enabled as a “formation.” Key
enablers for this squad in the conduct of operations will
be the reduction of the Soldier’s load and improved power
and energy capacities. Conduct a high-level assessment
of critical task lists for the squad, its impact upon current
and future logistics capabilities, and correlation of current
investments to desired capabilities.
*Evaluate the use of Army multi-modal capabilities in
support of contingency operations during Phases II-V of
the Joint Operational Phasing Model.
*Assess the transformation of Army sustainment over the
past decade. What changes (if any) need to be made to
Army logistics force structure and modularity concept.
*Evaluate the joint logistics lessons learned from
Afghanistan and Iraq to identify what changes need to be
made to DOTMLPF.
*Assess both Army and joint lessons learned from a
logistics planner perspective and determine which
findings should be incorporated into the future logistics
planner’s template or identified as new planning factors
for consideration.
*Identify the changes that need to be made to Army
contracting doctrine and policy as a result of contracting
operations experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
*Analyze the current acquisition process. Identify
recommendations for improving the requirements
determination, validation, and funding process to speed
delivery solutions to the warfighter.
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2. *Assess the utility and role of advanced technologies in Army
sustainment and logistics.
a. *Discuss potential contingency basing initiatives that
would improve energy requirements and efficiencies.
Determine metrics for operational energy that can be
employed at the tactical level.
b. *The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated that
the OSD must take steps to strengthen the technology and
private sector’s industrial base to facilitate innovation, to
include ensuring that critical skills are not lost and that
access to venture funding and overall access to capital
for small technology start-up companies are assessed.
Evaluate observations on OSD efforts to address potential
private sector critical issues.
c. *Identify science and technological advancements that can
be used to meet future logistics requirements.
d. *Efforts to develop the means to transfer NIPRNet data
onto and off the SIPRNet in near-real time without
compromising security have not kept pace with the
demands of commanders and staffs for a shared true
common operating picture. Identify a clear and rational
path for the Army to achieve an integrated network for
planning, execution, and control.
e. *Conduct a review to develop alternative energy sources
to mitigate the dependency on logistics and reduce the
number of resupply missions. Explore the use of microgrids for power generation and converting waste to energy
are examples of possible life- and cost-saving methods.
f. *Assess logistics dependencies on space-based/spaceenabled communications systems. Identify potential
means to recognize, respond to, and mitigate the impacts
of degraded space environments on the delivery of
critical logistics support for combat operations. Identify
opportunities to train logistics leaders at all levels on how
to operate in a degraded space environment. Identify
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continuity of operations requirements that might help
mitigate SATCOM points of failure.
g. *Conduct a review of industry and government initiatives
for space-based solar power, with the focus on the current
level of investment dollars and projected return on
investment. Space solar power is the conversion of solar
energy at a location outside of the earth’s atmosphere into
power that is usable either in space or on earth. Microwave
technology would be used to transmit energy through
space back to receiver stations on earth. Commercial sector
firms are exploring the capability, but it is not addressed
in either the National Space Strategy or the Army Space
Strategy. The review should focus on technical and
economic feasibility.
3. *Evaluate measures to overcome anti-access and area-denial
strategies.
4. *Assess whether and how the Army should maintain forces
overseas.
5. *Evaluate measures for operating in areas with primitive and
austere infrastructures.
6. *Moving beyond the scope of the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL) publication on Money As A Weapons System
(MAAWS); how can in-depth planning for Operational
Contract Support (OCS) be integrated into the Combatant
Commander’s Campaign Plan and subsequently into the
Department of State/United Nations follow-on strategies?
7. *Assess the role of doctrine in a dynamic environment and in
the age of wiki-information.
8. *Assess various methods to organize capabilities at the
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level:
a. *Is modularity most functional at the BCT level or better
considered at the battalion or division level of employment?
5

b. *What are the effects of equipping the aviation force to
80% of the Army Acquisition Objective?
9. *Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning,
and forward stationing.
a. *ASCCs and MACOMs frequently request short-term
loans from APS giving auditors the impression that the
Army uses APS as a convenient supply warehouse instead
of as a strategic asset; can APS fulfill both roles?
b. *Virtually all fielded products of a Program Manager (PM)
will be deployed into an operational theater sometime
during the product life cycle; if that product requires
contracted support during the deployed period, how best
can PMs plan for the application of OCS when mapping
the life cycle?
c. *What is the most efficient means to integrate systems
modernization into APS strategic planning?
10. *Evaluate the impact of the expanding or decreasing roles of
contractors and other civilians in defense operations.
a. *Operational Contract Support: How can we strengthen
the commander’s ability to use OCS and how do we
structure the force to be able to effectively execute OCS
during full spectrum operations?
b. *Is there an over reliance on contractor logistics support
(CLS)? Assess/Analyze CLS and what capabilities should
be maintained/adjusted in the future maintenance force
structure given pending budget and force structure
constraints.
c. *What is the most effective way to encourage green cost
savings and forward-thinking contractors with regard to
base life support for our contingency forces?
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11. *Should there be a Joint Depot Maintenance Organization
as some have suggested or should each Service Chief retain
the capability to sustain its Service responsibilities under
Title X? Assess the benefits and risks associated with such
an organization as well as its effectiveness in light of the
performance of Army depots over the last decade.
12. Assess inter- and intra-theater mobility requirements for the
U.S. military.
13. Given energy security as a fundamental requirement of
land operations, recommend methods that land component
commanders should employ for sustainment operations.
III. Strategy and Military Change in an Austere Environment
1. **Force Structure Drawdown: Implications for Army 2020.
2. **Acquisition Reform: Streamlining the Process to Field
Equipment before It’s Obsolete.
3. *Assess the need for, and roles of, an Army and land forces in
the future operating environment.
a. *Given the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan
(and no major competitor in the next decade) how large
of an Army is needed to meet the Nation’s security needs
and to ensure that the Army can expand in time of crisis?
b. *What core capabilities must the Army preserve in any
reorganization or downsizing?
c. *Assess the sufficiency of the Army’s current niche
capabilities (such as cyber, ballistic missile defense, etc.)
to meet the requirements of the strategic environment in
the mid-term (3-8 years).
d. *Assess tactical network capabilities and whether they
are sufficient, effective, interoperable, and secure for 21stcentury operations.
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e. *Evaluate and identify what missions the Army could
eliminate as a result of the proposed Defense Department
budget cuts.
4. *Assess the size, structure, and design of the future Army:
a. *What is the most efficient brigade-division-corps
organization/structure to support TSC while retaining
the ability to meet crisis response needs (maximize forces
available)?
b. *What should the roles and missions of corps and ASCCs
be? Are they duplicative?
c. *Does the Army need to maintain separate heavy, Stryker,
and light combat formations?
d. *How agile is the current institutional Army in terms of its
ability to react to changing or surge requirements?
e. *Assess and recommend an EAB HQ structure for division,
corps, ASCC, and theater enabler commands.
f. *The Army has revised FM 3-0 and changed the Army
Operating Concept to Unified Operations—enabled by
core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and
Wide Area Security. How will this impact Army force
structure—design and mix?
g. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of creating
regionally focused Army units.
h. How can Army forces be structured, equipped, and trained
to operate effectively in remote dynamic environments
without relying on continuous energy or water resupply?
5. *Assess models of Army force generation.
a. *Is the Generating Force properly organized to ensure
that the Army fields capabilities against our articulated
strategic requirements?
b. *Assess the ability of the Army to generate large numbers
of formations in the event of a significant land campaign,
given the high-tech nature of today’s BCTs?
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c. *What is the impact of the growing commercialization
of our depot-level maintenance on our ability to react to
changing capability requirements?
d. *The Army has revised FM 3-0 and changed the Army
Operating Concept to Unified Operations—enabled by
core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and
Wide Area Security. How will this impact ARFORGEN to
include access to the Reserve Component?
e. *Assess the effects of operationalizing the Reserve
Component.
6. Recommend methods for integrating nonlethal systems into
Army operations.
7. Examine the strategic implications for the Army of space as a
theater of war.
8. Evaluate measures to integrate military (hard power) and
nonmilitary (hard and soft power) tools to achieve strategic
objectives and to avoid or resolve conflict.
9. Examine the implications of U.S. missile defense for allies and
potential adversaries.
10. Assess potential impact of global climate change on U.S.
national security.
11. Evaluate how energy capabilities influence decisions
regarding strategic engagement.
IV. Leadership, Civil-Military Relations, and Culture
1. **Health of the Force.
2. *New elements in U.S. civil-military relations.
a. *What are the characteristics required of an effective
Strategic Communications Plan that illustrates to Congress
and the American public the enduring requirement to
9

maintain a suitably sized and effective ground component
as the key element of the defense establishment?
b. *Evaluate potential changes to U.S. institutions, founding
documents, or policy formulation processes to reflect the
21st-century security environment and the changed nature
of armed conflict: Are the current efforts and programs
sufficient to achieve the envisioned benefits of “whole
of government” approaches to contemporary security
challenges?
c. Assess the apparent gap between civilian and military
cultures and its effect on interagency interaction and
cooperation.
d. Assess the moral and ethical implications of civilian
casualties with regard to decisionmaking in contemporary
war.
3. Evaluate the ethical implications associated with landpower
employment in stability, security force assistance, and
counterinsurgency operations; and recommend whether and
how Army education, training, and leadership programs
should be adjusted.
4. Assess the status of the Army as a profession.
a. Assess the status of the Chaplaincy within the Army as a
profession.
5. Analyze the impact of changing military service requirements
on families.
a. Assess the contribution of chaplains in promoting
resiliency and recovery for Army Soldiers and Families.
6. Assess the implications of adopting commercial best business
practices for the military.
7. Assess the need for greater energy security awareness at
various levels within the Army.
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V. Cyber Attack/Defense, Networks, Information Technology
1. *When does an attack in cyberspace constitute an act of war?
2. *Assess the training and exercise requirements for cyber
defense: Does the Army exercise and prepare its cyber/
network defense capabilities enough to address the risk posed
by a cyber attack?
3. Assess ongoing efforts to integrate information technology
(IT) into the conduct of war (Dept. of Army, G-6; POC: LTC
Paul Craft (703) 693-3062; paul.g.craft.mil@mail.mil).
a. Examine the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
of global network connectivity (C4, ISR, Coalition, etc.) down
to the individual Soldier on the battlefield.
b. Evaluate the possibilities of converging the intelligence and/
or sustainment networks into the existing tactical C4 transport
network (WIN-T, JTRS, NetWarrior).
c. Determine a process, or set of processes, to increase the
transparency and fidelity of IT planning, programming,
budgeting, and execution given that IT requirements and
expenditures are spread across 101 different MDEPS and six
PEGs in the POM.
d. Assess what IT services (i.e., email, collaboration, file, voice,
etc.) could be provided at an enterprise level and which
services should be provided by the Army versus another Joint
Service or Agency.
e. Determine a methodology to better govern IT expenditures
and compliance enforcement at the MACOM level.
f. Examine how the Army’s overarching network, the
LandWarNet, can enable a smaller more agile Army and
improve its effectiveness and efficiency through all Joint
phases of the operation and in all environments.
g. Examine how Army leaders can be trained and educated to
employ the network as a central, intrinsic portion of their
combined arms fight.
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h. Evaluate the cyber threat on a networked Army at the strategic,
operational, and tactical level.
i. Assess the relationship(s) between network operations and
cyber operations.
4. Assess the challenges of distinguishing between crimes and
acts of war for certain activities in cyberspace.
VI. Homeland Security/Civil Support
1. *Assess the effects of the Mexican Drug Cartels on U.S. defense
and homeland security requirements.
2. Evaluate current measures for identifying and protecting
Department of Defense (DoD) and/or non-DoD critical
infrastructure.
3. Recommend ways for establishing domestic and international
intelligence and other information sharing mechanisms
between homeland defense, homeland security, and civil
support entities?
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EVOLVING REGIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
POC: Dr. Steven Metz (717) 245-3822
steven.k.metz.civ@mail.mil
I. The Middle East and North Africa
1. Assess political upheaval in the Middle East following the
Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan revolutions.
2. Assess Iranian regional assertiveness and its implications for
Middle East security.
3. Assess threats to U.S. interests with respect to a stable,
sovereign Iraq.
4. Recommend ways for improving the effectiveness of U.S.
military presence in the Persian/Arabian Gulf without raising
the profile of U.S. forces.
5. Assess security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
6. Evaluate U.S. strategy toward Syria.
7. Assess the strategic implications of increasing Chinese
interests in Middle East oil, arms sales, and economic aid.
8. Evaluate the nature of politically-oriented Islamic militancy
and salafi jihadism and their implications for U.S. interests,
regional security, and energy security.
II. Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Assess the evolving role and organization of AFRICOM, and
its receptivity within Africa.
2. Assess efforts to address the terrorism in Africa.
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3. Assess lessons learned from Africa’s insurgencies and
implications for Africa’s future conflicts.
4. Assess strategic implications of Chinese, Iranian, Indian, and
Brazilian activity in Africa.
5. Recommend courses of action for improving maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea subregion.
6. Evaluate U.S. military roles in addressing human security
issues in Africa.
7. Evaluate the effects of climate change and conflict in Africa.
8. Assess the American role in the continent of Africa with
regard to energy security.
9. Assess the role of the U.S. in managing potential conflict in
Nigeria.
III. Asia-Pacific
1. Assess how the U.S. should balance its security interests in
China and Taiwan given the Pacific “pivot.”
2. Assess the Obama Administration’s “back to Asia” efforts.
3. Assess the implications of China’s growing economic and
military power in the region.
4. Assess the strategic implications of China’s growing space
capabilities.
5. Examine the impact of North Korea’s leadership change and
assess the future of North Korea.
6. Assess future
relationship.

prospects

for
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the

Japan-U.S.

security

7. Assess the future of ASEAN and the U.S. strategic posture in
the region.
8. Recommend ways to transform U.S. forward deployment in
Asia.
9. Evaluate future U.S. energy security strategy for Asia and the
Pacific.
IV. Europe
1. Assess implications for the U.S. Army of future cooperation
between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
2. Analyze energy security in Europe, including operational,
infrastructure, and strategic energy security, and related
implications for the U.S. Army.
3. Evaluate the impact of ISAF on NATO.
4. Assess the prospects for Russo-American security and/or
defense cooperation.
5. Evaluate the U.S. role in EPAA, and the related implications
for the U.S. Army.
6. Assess Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the
United States.
7. Assess the impact of growing Muslim populations on
European security policy.
8. Assess the strategic and operational implications of
reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe.
9. Recommend ways for closing the U.S.-Europe military
capabilities gap.
10. Recommend ways that the United States can leverage
European engagement with China.
15

11. Assess the implications of U.S.-European defense industry
cooperation and/or integration.
V. South and Central Asia
1. Recommend ways that the U.S. should balance its security
interests between India and Pakistan.
2. Assess projections for India as a rising regional and global
power, and the strategic implications for U.S. foreign and
security policy.
3. Recommend methods for managing the global commons—
from the Strait of Malacca to the Gulf of Aden.
4. Assess the strategic implications of China-India cooperation
and conflict.
5. Assess the strategic implications of energy development in
the Caucasus and Caspian regions.
6. Assess the merits of a U.S. military presence in Central Asia.
VI. Western Hemisphere
1. Recommend ways for improving security ties with Brazil.
2. Assess lessons from the Colombian insurgency.
3. Assess the strategic implications of illegal immigration and
people smuggling.
4. Assess the strategic implications of Narco-funded terrorism
networks, and recommend ways to address them.
5. Assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese
engagement in Latin America.
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PART II
COMMAND SPONSORED TOPICS
National Guard Bureau
POC: COL Robert J. Howell (703) 607-9127
robert.joseph.howell@mail.mil
1. The National Guard (NG) State Partnership Program (SPP) has
distinguished itself as a highly effective security cooperation
program. Identify ways to optimize the support provided by our
State Partnership Program (SPP) partners for future operations.
For example, when Polish units deployed to Bosnia, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, they were accompanied by imbedded liaison
personnel from their State Partner—Illinois. This is one example of
approximately 12 partner countries that had embedded SPP Soldiers
deploy with them. Is this an effective strategy and should there
be a plan to initiate this process in each partnership, developing a
standard requirement?
2. Members of the NG possess many civilian skill sets that could be
used in Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). An example of this are
the Agricultural Development Teams (ADT) formed by the NG that
have proven their value in Afghanistan. What other skill sets could
be used to assist the Combatant Commands and the Department of
State (DoS) in their “whole of government” approach to assisting
allies. (For instance, NG personnel with financial experience could
assist in developing financial sector/markets, etc.) Recommend
methods for capturing this information and whether it should be
centralized at the National level or decentralized at the state/unit
level.
3. To ensure that the NG possesses the appropriate resources to support
the civil leadership during a civil emergency, is there a basic “order
of battle,” i.e., a list of the type of units that should be allotted to each
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state, territory, and District of Columbia? What organic equipment
should be in these units and what would be the methodology for
employment?
4. The British concept of “Sponsored Reserve” uses contractors who
support the government in civilian status, but upon mobilization,
continue to support the military in deployed operations in a reserve
status. A 2009 UK Ministry of Defence Report stated, “Some
services which are provided in peacetime by a civilian contractor
are provided on operations by staff drawn from the contractor’s
workforce who are members of the Reserve Forces, and have been
mobilized. Individuals in this category are known as the Sponsored
Reserve. They are currently associated with a range of contracts.” Is
this concept workable in the U.S. for the NG in light of the civilian
skill sets of current contractors, tradesmen, and other capabilities?
5. During the Cold War, the U.S. military and its allies trained
numerous linguists and foreign area officers in part to study potential
adversaries and to prepare for possible deployments to various
continents. This provided the U.S. military with a robust international
relations capability. Due to the past 10 years of constant operational
deployments, this critical capability has been diminished. Should the
NG develop/enhance a program to educate foreign area specialists
and linguists, and what would be the benefit?
6. With the intent to maximize the benefit of home state training
becoming a future focal point for NG formations, a holistic
examination of our training support systems and structure is
appropriate. Since the competition for training areas and ranges will
increase, how do we develop alternative means of training units
and achieving force generation training standards in the emerging
environment? A consideration is the expanded use of advanced
technology provided by training simulations and devices. Another
consideration is prepositioning equipment and transporting troops
to that location. What enhanced training concepts will be required to
maintain a ready Army or Air NG unit in the future?
18

7. The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, has Major
Force Program 11 for Special Operations unique operations and
equipment. Assess the DOTMLPF impacts of the funds for dual use
(Defense Support of Civil Authorities [DSCA] and Warfighting)
equipment and facilities. An example of dual use facilities are the
NG Armories, while an example of dual use equipment might be the
trucks used by all NG units during DSCA events.
8. In light of the May 2012 release of Army Doctrine Reference
Publication (ADRP) 3.0, Unified Land Operations,  assess the DOTMLPF
impacts of keeping the NG as part of the Operational Reserve versus
as part of the Strategic Reserve.
9. In keeping with the Army’s concept of dedicating Active Component
(AC) BCTs with regional Combatant Commands, examine the
concept of dedicating NG BCTs in support of regional Combatant
Commands. For instance, have one group of NG BCTs (six per the
current ARFORGEN model) dedicated to SOUTHCOM. During their
year for deployment, they would be dedicated to support a variety of
missions throughout SOUTHCOM. Using their military and civilian
skills, they could perform a variety of Building Partnership Capacity
(BPC) tasks. They could also support the regionally oriented Special
Forces Group in augmenting Security Force Assistance Teams. By
dedicating six NG BCTs to this mission, the BCTs become regionally
oriented and are able to use their military and civilian skills to fully
support the Combatant Commander.
10. In view of the changes occurring regarding the use of the Reserves
during domestic operations, examine the concept (and explain the
pros and cons) of allowing the The Adjutant General (TAG) of a
particular State to have direct tasking authority for the Title 10
Reserve Component forces located in the State. What authorities
would need to be modified and what DOTMLPF changes would be
needed?
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11. What are the impacts of changes in the local economy on a local NG
unit? Do changes in the economy have a major effect on the unit and
the National Guard as a whole at state and/or federal level?
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U.S. Army Reserve, Office of the Chief
POC: LTC David Connelly (703) 806-7789
david.connelly@usar.army.mil
1. H
 ow should the Reserve Component promote, cultivate, and
manage civilian skills?
a. How can the DoD develop an effective Civilian Acquired Skills
Database to identify and track Army Reserve (AR) Soldiers with
unique civilian acquired skills?
b. As the Army enters a period of fiscal austerity, how can the AR
leverage its diverse civilian skills to mitigate the gaps caused by
resource reductions?
c. How can the Army leverage AR civilian skills against adversary
niche capabilities (i.e., lawyers, police, network security, and
software development)?
d. How can AR civilian skills be leveraged to better support
Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) TSC plans?
e. Can the AR best support GCC needs by aligning its units
to Combatant Commands based on U.S. demographics and
location? What benefits are gained by developing force structure
in specific locations that could deliver critical language skills and
cultural experiences for a specific AOR.
2. Operational Reserve.
a. Considering the recent shift to Asia/Pacific—are there
advantages/disadvantages to forward stationing Army Reserve
Forces to OCONUS training sites (Darwin, Australia—PACOM;
Korea; Fort Buchanan, etc.)?
b. Is it viable and feasible for the AR to establish forward positioned
training sets within the USSOUTHCOM AOR to support
exercises? Would it be advantageous to preposition training
sets tailored for this AOR? Explain how these assets could be
leveraged for contingency operations. How adaptable is this
model for AFRICOM and PACOM?
21

c. What are the strategic lessons learned across the Army Reserve
from the numerous mobilizations during the past decade? What
changes can be made to improve the process considering an
austere fiscal environment with fewer resources? How can the
Reserve Component do more with less to facilitate expansion/
regeneration to meet future operational challenges?
d. How should the AR work with Combatant Commands to
maximize the use of its AR capabilities?
e. How can the new access rules to the RC, approved in NDAA
2012, change the utilization of Army Reserve units for planned
missions?
3. Balance of AC and RC Forces.
a. How can the Reserve Component contribute to the concept of
reversibility—the ability to quickly regenerate capabilities in
response to a strategic shock?
b. Should any missions/roles be assigned only to or primarily to the
AR?
c. If not a strategic reserve what should be the new model for RC
utilization?
d. How should DoD manage the RC to enable reversibility?
4. Defense Support to Civil Authorities.
a. Considering recent legislative changes to Defense Support to
Civil Authorities within NDAA 2012, what civilian capabilities
should be duplicated or augmented by military capabilities, and
vice versa?
b. What cultural/legal/social/financial limits exist to Defense
Support to Civil Authorities?
c. The Army Reserve has 43K in generating force structure to
support TRADOC conducted IET, TASS, and ROTC missions;
FORSCOM/1st Army collective training missions; and MEDCOM
missions. However, Section 516 Authority only allows the use
of Reserve Component for planned Combatant Command
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missions, primarily OCONUS focused on BPC/TSC. How could
an involuntary mobilization authority be used within CONUS to
support service missions to benefit the Army? How would the
law need to be changed?
5. Career and Personnel Management.
a. How does implementation of the Continuum of Service concept
relate to the Profession of Arms? Is an ”Army Professional” also
a ”Soldier for Life”?
b. How can the Army best leverage the experiences from recent
operations? Compare and contrast to other post war model?
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U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
POC: CDR Jeff Melody +49(0)-170-729-4435
Jeffrey.Melody@usafricom.mil
1. Evaluate multilateral approaches for security and governance in the
Maghreb and Egypt.
2. Assess the long-term implications of the Arab Spring on regional
security and on AFRICOM’s strategy. What does the future picture
of Northern Africa and the Sahel look like?
3. How does an increasingly resource constrained environment over
the next 10-15 years impact current U.S. African regional strategy?
a. What elements of national power do we apply?
b. Who are the key African partners to engage with in order to
develop or maintain access in support of U.S. security interests?
4. Assess the regional impact of continued instability in the East Africa
region.
5. Assess the long-term impact on African security of sustenance issues
in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Maghreb regions (food and water
security).
6. Assess strategic implications of women, peace, and security initiatives
in Africa.
7. How do African security issues impact U.S. national security interests
in the Asia-Pacific region?
8. In light of the President’s Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD10), AFRICOM must continue to refine and assess its efforts in
concert with Africans, International partners, and U.S. Government
(USG) agencies to give primacy to the prevention of mass atrocities.
This effort must include the wide range of informational, economic,
health-enabling, military, and diplomatic tools available within and
outside of the USG.
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U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
POC: COL John Surdu (301) 688-2350; Mr. Dennis Bartko (240) 373-1940
jrsurdu@nsa.gov; gdbartk@nsa.gov
1. What are the unique operational opportunities that exist in the
cyberspace domain that are not possible in any other domains?
a.  Is “cyber” merely another form of “fires,” or does cyber bring
something unique to the strategic, operational, and/or tactical
toolbox?
b. What should the role of cyber operations be in the conduct of
military operations and the defense of the nation?
2. Given the difficulty of unambiguous attribution at “network speeds”
and the availability of sophisticated hacking tools to non-nationstate actors, is deterrence by punishment possible in cyberspace?
a. 
Is deterrence by denial feasible? This discussion should also
consider how much attribution is “enough,” how best to
“demonstrate” preemptive or retaliatory capabilities, and the
aspects of intelligence gain/loss applicable to deterrence.
3. With respect to building partnerships with allies, what is the role of
“collective self-defense”?
a. What are the implications for preserving the privacy of U.S.
citizens and protecting sensitive intelligence sources?
4. W
 ho bears the responsibility for protecting and defending
cyberspace?
a. What is the appropriate role for DoD? For the private sector?
b. How should DoD assist the private sector—especially the Defense
Industrial Base and other critical infrastructure sectors—both
prior to and after malevolent intrusions? This discussion should
not be confined to current authorities but should also consider
what authorities might be warranted in the future.
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5. Many components of our mission critical systems are produced
overseas, which raises the specter of undetected malware built
into those systems. How should DoD (and the nation) manage the
exposure, risk, and/or threat to our supply chain for defense and
critical infrastructure sectors?
6. Assume movement to a DoD-wide cloud architecture (the Joint
Information Environment), which would allow the repurposing of
Global Information Grid (GIG) operators to more active defense and
offensive cyber operations. How should the force be structured in
the next 5 years? Ten years?
7. The Monroe Doctrine was a declarative policy that announced to
Europe that intervention within our sphere of influence would not be
tolerated. What would a similar declarative policy for cyber entail?
How might it be enforced? Would it create more problems than it
addresses?
8. There have been a number of recent discussions about norms of
behavior in cyberspace. Totalitarian regimes want to use such
discussions to control the free access of their people to new ideas.
Western nations want to limit hacking activity and make cyberspace
safe. Can these objectives be reconciled?
9. What does “tactical cyber” look like in the next 5 years?
a. How do we streamline and integrate cyber, SIGINT,
communications, electronic warfare, and information operations?
Other Services are moving in this direction.
b. How should the Army change across DOTMLPF to more
effectively leverage cyber at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels of war?
10. Today it is an axiom that the offense has the advantage in cyberspace.
The defender must be right all the time; the attacker only has to
get lucky once. What conditions might change the calculus to give
primacy to the defense in cyberspace?
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U.S. Army’s Cyber Command (ARCYBER)
POC: LTC Karla Brischke (703) 706-2052
karla.j.brischke.mil@mail.mil
1. Strategic.
a. Assess Army efforts to respond to the evolving cyberspace
challenges of manning, training, and equipping for decisive
operations.
b. Assess options for integrating current information related
capabilities (signal, intelligence, IO, EW) within the Army to
produce a combined cyber force capable of dominating the
information environment through all phases of operations.
c. Examine the strategic implications of declaring cyberspace the
fifth operational domain.
d. Assess the mission command requirements of cyberspace at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
e. Assess the knowledge, skills, and abilities required by military
cyberspace professionals that will enable the United States to
attain superiority in the fifth operational domain.
f. Assess the impact of cyberspace capabilities on China’s efforts to
become a global superpower.
g. Outline the theater security cooperation requirements that
are needed to build cyber partnerships with key allies and
international partners as a result of the changing strategic
environment.
h. Assess how a more CONUS-based Army of the future will utilize
virtual partnerships to conduct Phase 0 (prevent and shape)
operations with key allies and international partners.
i. Evaluate the potential impact of social media/networking upon
unified land operations.
j. Evaluate how the Army achieves cross-domain synergy utilizing
cyberspace operations in anti-access/area-denial.
k. Determine the best methods of increasing the understanding
of unified land-cyber operations through the use of education,
training, and leader development.
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l. Examine the Army’s role in the U.S. whole of government cyber
security strategy.
m. Assess the cyber security role of the Army and U.S. Army
National Guard in homeland defense.
n. Examine the implications of U.S. cyberspace defense strategy for
allies and potential adversaries.
o. Does the Army need new kinds of formations to conduct cyber
intelligence, conduct maneuver in and through cyberspace,
generate fires in and through cyberspace, sustain cyberspace
operations and formations, and protect cyberspace operations
and formations?
p. Cyberspace is comprised of the physical, logical, and cognitive. If
most of the world’s information is in cyberspace, what does this
mean for future Army influence activities?
q. How we leverage the approach of SOF, intelligence, and
cyberspace operations to achieve more balance across the force?
2. Other.
a. What are the gaps and seams between cyber, EW, and IO—
What coordination/de-confliction is required for synchronized
operations?
b. What offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are required as
part of the force structure at the BCT level?
c. Develop metrics to conduct an operational assessment of
cyberspace operations.
d. Evaluate how Army tactical/operational commanders may
achieve effects using the land/cyber concept.
e. Examine the strategic implications of declaring cyberspace
operations as a warfighting function.
f. Examine methods and requirements of integrating cyber effects
into targeting at all levels of warfare.
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U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
POC: Mr. Donald Cranz (717) 430-7445
Donald.cranz.civ@mail.mil
1. Assess for the U.S. Army the implications of future cooperation
between the EU and NATO.
2. Recommend ways to harmonize EU, NATO, and U.S. goals for the
modernization of European militaries.
3. Assess the strategic implications of the European financial crisis on
the long-term defense relationship between NATO, the EU, and the
United States.
4. Assess the impact of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN/UNIFIED
PROTECTOR on the development of European Security and Defense
Policy.
5. Analyze energy security in Europe, including operational,
infrastructure, and strategic energy security, and related implications
for the U.S. Army.
6. Evaluate the long-term impact of ISAF operations on NATO
(interoperability/sustainability).
7. Assess the prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense
cooperation.
8. Evaluate the U.S. role in the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA), potential allied contributions and burden sharing for
ballistic missile defense (BMD), and the related implications for the
U.S. Army.
9. Assess Russia’s future relationships with Europe and the United
States.
10. Evaluate the potential for normalization of interstate relations
between Serbia and Kosovo.
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11. Assess the impact of growing diversity of populations on European
security policy.
12. Assess the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in
promoting stability in the Balkans.
13. Assess the strategic and operational implications of reconfiguring
the U.S. military presence in Europe.
14. Recommend ways for closing the U.S.-Europe military capabilities
gap.
15. Recommend ways the United States can leverage European
engagement with China.
16. Assess the implications of U.S.-European defense industry
cooperation and/or integration.
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U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
POC: John Gailliard (719) 556-5213
john.gailliard@northcom.mil
1. Evaluate the exigency, efficacy, and feasibility of legislation
that requires interoperational coordination, integration, and
synchronization in planning, operations, exercises, and resourcing,
much like the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for DoD in obtaining its
Joint orientation.
2. USNORTHCOM J3 (NC/J3).
a. 
Develop recommendations to improve DoD Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA) during a no-notice complex catastrophe in
the homeland, where additional force structure is not available.
b. 
Determine the best way to improve DoD and interagency
coordination in Mexico.
c. Evolving Warfare challenges require USNORTHCOM to maintain
sufficient combat capability to deter or defeat attacks both
symmetric and asymmetric, on the homeland. Define sufficient
combat capability required in order to defend the homeland.
3. NORAD J3 (N/J3).
a. Assess the Army’s contribution to achieving all-domain fusedsituational awareness as it relates to defense of the homeland.
Discuss the Army’s synchronized efforts with NORAD,
USNORTHCOM, and the Interagency.
4. N-NC/J5.
a. 
Are Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) a
national security threat to the United States? What is DoD’s role to
counter this threat?
b. What is the Army’s role in the Arctic as future access to the region
expands?
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5. N-NC/J6.
a. Assess Army communications requirements to support combatant
command operations in the Arctic regions.
6. N-NC/J8.
a. What are the strategic implications of social media in accomplishing
missions across the spectrum of homeland defense, homeland
security, and DSCA?
7. How can the Army contribute strategically or operationally to
provide needed capabilities?
a. What capabilities are required to provide C2 and theater setting
activities in planning, exercising, and execution of HD, DSCA,
and cooperative defense missions?
b. What domain surveillance, detection, and tracking capabilities are
required to provide warning data to national authorities? What
capabilities are required to rapidly disseminate threat information
to senior decisionmakers, engagement authorities, coalition, and
interagency partners?
c. 
What capabilities are required to provide comprehensive and
tailored cyberspace domain awareness capabilities that provide
time shared situational awareness and integrated offensive and
defensive solutions?
d. 
What capabilities are required to provide resilient network
infrastructure to support mission essential functions in an
electromagnetic pulse and/or cyber stressed environment to
support communications among DoD, federal agencies, and
supported mission partners?
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U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
POC: LtCol Brian C. Proctor (305) 437-3536
brian.proctor@hq.southcom.mil
1. Western Hemisphere.
a. Recommend ways for improving security ties with Brazil. What
are the possible security implications of neglected U.S./BRA
defense, space, nuclear, and energy cooperation?
b. Assess lessons from the Colombian insurgency (i.e., the power
vacuum left by the FARC), will the BACRAM fill this?
c. Assess the strategic implications of illegal immigration and
people smuggling.
d. Assess the strategic implications of narco-funded terrorism
networks, and recommend ways to address them.
e. Assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese
engagement in Latin America. Regarding China’s investment in
critical infrastructure (multi-modal nodes, telecommunications,
etc.), will a tipping point occur when Chinese contributions and/
or influence warrants U.S. intervention in order to preserve our
national interests in the region?
f. Assess the strategic implications of illicit trafficking (e.g.,
TOC) expansion into other GCC AORs as a result of increased
intervention in the WHEM (i.e., SOUTHCOM to AFRICOM to
EUCOM—shift to alternate Arrival Zone).
g. Assess the strategic implications of increased Iranian influence in
the SOUTHCOM AOR.
h. What DoD roles and missions support nontraditional security
threats (Law enforcement mission sets)?
i. How do we achieve greater effectiveness of a Western Hemisphere
Regional Security Organization (e.g., OAS, SICA, RSS, and CFAC)
in addressing transregional security challenges?
j. Recommend ways to coordinate with Russia to leverage their
capabilities in support of the CTOC effort in the WHEM.
k. Recommend ways DoD can integrate the Interagency to improve
governmental institutions to address governance and social
issues that foster environments conducive to TOC.
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l. Assess and recommend ways to improve GCC cross-AOR
boundary efforts that address transnational threats.
m. Assess the strategic implications of nonstate actors exerting
increasing influence in weakened nation states in the Western
Hemisphere.
n. What are the implications to the WHEM of a VEN, post-Chavez?
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U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
POC: LTC Raymond Cirasa (618) 220-6594
Raymond.Cirasa@ustranscom.mil
1. Expeditionary Theater Opening (ETO).
     POC: Mr. Jeff Ackerson (618) 220-4814
a. I n light of our new strategy and CONUS based military, along with
the issues involved with the Joint Operational Access Concept,
recommend a new look at the Expeditionary Theater Opening
(ETO). HQ DA G4 and JFCOM have previously examined the
topic, but the outcome stalled due to projected costs.
b. We will need to project and sustain our forces, and the logistics
portion of the ETO process will be critical. The Army will play a
big role along with other joint partners. ETO), an approved Joint
Staff Concept, Mission: Provide a joint expeditionary capability
to rapidly establish and initially operate ports of debarkation
(air and sea), facilitate port throughput and assist in setting the
conditions for the ”fall in“ of larger Service theater distribution
and sustainment forces where/when appropriate within a theater
of operations.
c. 
Examine the Army capability to deploy rapidly the logistics
enabling forces to conduct theater opening operations, including
sustainment and distribution missions.
2. GCC Theater Distribution Center.
     POC: Mr. Paul Curtis (618) 220-6481
Theater Distribution is a key element of the Sustainment Plan for
follow-on forces after the initial surge of forces involved in Joint Task
Force-Port Opening. Tasked forces will quickly pass the Logistics
Forward Node and need an established Logistics Distribution Center.
Theater Distribution is not a new concept but requires consideration
in light of the speed and challenges associated with port opening in
a nonsupport or perhaps hostile environment. Efficient and effective
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theater distribution is key to a successful campaign in the host country.
Recommend assessment and analysis of:
a. A fully deployable Theater Distribution Center with assigned
personnel and support equipment.
b. 
Development of a containerized/airlift-ready Theater
Distribution Center that can be deployed and fielded by
C+30, ready for use by C+50. This Theater Distribution Center
would require inclusion in the TPFDD for the COCOM, with
developed ULN and UICs.
c. Intermodal capability at the Theater Distribution Center to
take advantage of the different capabilities offered by rail/
truck/ship/air.
d. Integration of coalition and host nation capabilities with the
Theater Distribution Center.
3. Global Distribution: Implications of Emerging Risks on U.S.
Ability to Project and Sustain Forces Globally.
POC: Mr. Jeff Worthing (618) 220-5230
a.	Assess shifts in geostrategic forces for their potential implications
on U.S. access to distribution nodes/distribution pathways within
allied, friendly, and cooperating nations (A/F/CNs). Consider
inducements, coercive measures, and commercial partnerships
that competitor nations may use to hinder or enable U.S. joint
force operations.
b.	Assess degradation of military and commercial infrastructure
(airports, seaports, multi-modal nodes, connectors, railroads,
and roadways) and future investments required to meet both
emerging commercial and military demands.
c.	Assess growing commercial demands on available CONUS and
OCONUS commercial capabilities (conveyances, warehousing/
storage capabilities, and infrastructure) and the potential negative
impact this may have on the future deployment and sustainment
of U.S. forces across the globe.
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d.	
Assess the distribution implications of the Joint Operational
Access Concept (JOAC) distributed operations precept on the
ability to deploy and operate on multiple independent lines
of operations. Identify consequences in terms of distribution
capabilities; infrastructure and access requirements; and enabling
political, military, and business relationships.
4. Sustainment Forecasting.
POC: Mr. John Pirmann (618) 220-6605
a. T
 he DoD now has more than 10 years of historical data concerning
the sustainment requirements of fielded forces operating at all
levels of engagement. Is it possible to use this data to predict
future sustainment requirements?
b.	
A detailed deep-dive analysis of this data may yield the
sustainment requirements of any force package being considered
for future deployment. Should the DoD decide to conduct such an
analysis, USTRANSCOM, the Combat Support Agencies, and the
Services may be able to forecast their sustainment requirements
in future deployment scenarios.
c. If done correctly, sustainment could be pushed to the warfighter
rather than pulled. Acquisition of required sustainment could
perhaps be executed in a more economical manner. More
cost effective transportation could be arranged to satisfy the
warfighter’s need in a timely manner while saving funding that
will undoubtedly be constrained in the future.
5. Sealift:

Maintaining Readiness through our Commercial
Maritime Partners.
POC: LCDR Christopher Gilbertson (618) 220-1163
a.	Over the past decade, the U.S. Maritime Industry has enjoyed
unprecedented success providing support to DoD. With OIF/
OND now complete, and OEF quickly beginning to wind down,
how do we maintain a U.S. flag commercial maritime fleet which
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remains commercially viable and able to meet DoD capacity
requirements? Is it feasible to implement a VISA Assured
Business program, modeled similarly to the one which is used by
the CRAF program?
b. Statutes such as the 1904 and 1954 Cargo Preference Acts
exist, which lend support to the Maritime Industry. While the
Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration has
responsibility for enforcing and tracking compliance with these
important laws, the unique nature of our globally interconnected
economy lends credence to the claim it may be time to overhaul
the statutes. There are very limited waivers and exceptions
to these laws which preclude DoD’s ability to circumvent the
language of the laws yet still meet the intent and ensure strategic
commercial maritime capability and capacity remains operating
What potential changes may be made to the Cargo Preference
Acts and the associated rules which govern their enforcement?
c.	Through multiple venues, the commercial transportation and
logistics industry has claimed contracting has superseded policy
and operational requirements in meeting transportation needs.
Normally when the warfighter generates a requirement, a means
to fill the requirement is developed within operational and policy
constraints, then passed to the contracting personnel who write
a contract which meets those requirements. Is the contracting
process improperly defining our operations and how we meet
commanders’ requirements?
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U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC-ARCIC)
POC: Mr. Troy Russell (757) 501-5302
troy.f.russell.civ@mail.mil
1. How will the Army be able to identify and meet the professional
military training requirements necessary to develop the ability of
foreign partners to conduct security operations?
2. How will the Army be able to conduct tough, realistic training with
foreign partners to foster the adaptability, initiative, confidence,
trust, and cohesion required to conduct security operations?
3. How will the Army be able to identify partners’ specific requirements
and possess the collective resources necessary to build their
institutional capability and capacity for security?
4. How will the Army be able to establish formal and informal
relationships with foreign partners to gain access and advance
shared global security interests?
5. How will the Army be able to support efforts led by other USG
agencies to enhance the ability of domestic and foreign partners for
governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law,
and other critical government functions?
6. How do local, state, and nonmilitary federal capabilities factor into
decisions for the national requirements for HLD and DSCA?
7. What are the most proactive approaches to resolving U.S. Mexican/
Canadian border issues?
8. What are the best means for the Army to execute its responsibilities to
protect critical infrastructure (nuclear power, fuel, communications,
and manufacturing)?
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9. How can the Army execute its responsibilities to protect natural
resources (oil, gas, timber, pipelines, etc.) as well as their routes of
delivery (ground, air, and sea)?
10. What are the Army’s requirements for domestic Emergency
Management Operations support to DoD installations/bases/posts
in a JIIM environment?
11. What are Army doctrinal, training, and leader/leadership and
education requirements for support to civilian authorities during
homeland defense and civil support missions in a JIIM environment?
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